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ABSTRACT 
This paper discusses how Prussia’s public education policy was intentionally 
guided by economic principles that modern economists have formalized and 
modeled. The essay compares the results of two economic models with the 
intentions held by Prussian government officials, which are enshrined in the 
research agenda of historians and academics. The paper concludes that 
Prussia’s public education policy was intuitively and intentionally influenced by 
economic principles and intuitions of the theoretical and empirical models 
chosen. 
Keywords: Prussia, education, expenditure, intentions, economic history 
JEL Codes: N33, N43, H30, H71, I20. 
RESUMEN 
Este artículo analiza la manera en que la política de educación pública de 
Prusia fue orientada intencionalmente hacia principios económicos que los 
economistas modernos han formalizado y replicado. El ensayo compara los 
resultados de dos modelos económicos con las intenciones de los funcionarios 
del gobierno prusiano, las cuales se encuentran recogidas en la agenda de 
investigación de historiadores y académicos. El documento concluye que la 
política de educación pública de Prusia fue intuitiva e intencionalmente 
influenciada por principios económicos y las orientaciones de los modelos 
teóricos y empíricos seleccionados para tal fin. 
Palabras clave: Prusia, educación, gasto, intenciones, historia económica  
Códigos JEL: N33, N43, H30, H71, I20. 
* A preliminary version of this article is available at 
http://www.fce.unal.edu.co/media/files/CentroEditorial/documentos/econografos/EE/econografos-EE-
161.pdf 
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INTRODUCTION  
Like most siblings, history and economics have a rocky albeit complementary 
relationship. They use vastly different tools to achieve the rigor required by the 
scientific method and often come to clashing conclusions. Nevertheless, there 
are times where historical research can enrich and nurture economic theory by 
showing that individual, governmental, and social class-based motivations and 
actions are consistent and commensurable with the mathematical and statistical 
models that tried to explain these very intents, spurs and decisions several 
years later. 
One case of brotherly cooperation between history and economics is the 
theoretical and empirical research surrounding the expansion of public 
education in Prussia between the last two decades of the 19th century and the 
first decade of the 20th.  
When one looks closely at Galor and Moav’s (2006) theoretical model, it is easy 
to find strong parallels between their theoretical development and the way in 
which Prussian officials planned and executed the country’s educational policy 
150 years ago. It is even possible to find in Friedrich Althoff a man who not only 
implemented taxation and investment in education as a means of economic 
growth, but also as an individual who saw the production of knowledge and 
human capital in Prussia as one would treat the production of consumer goods. 
On the other hand, Hollenbach’s (2019) statistical findings are congruent with 
how historians portray the interests, aims and decisions of the Prussian 
industrialist elite and particular government officials throughout the 1880s, 
1890s and early 1900s. 
This paper will explore the connection between these two theoretical models 
and the intentions of two of Prussia’s most prominent individuals, firstly, by 
giving a brief account of the public Prussian education in the late 1800s and 
early 1900s and its main objectives as a tool of economic and social policy and, 
secondly, by briefly explaining Galor and Moav’s (2006) model and 
Hollenbach’s (2019) empirical findings. Finally, this work will also expose 
evidence of intentionality in Althoff’s and Falk’s decisions by reviewing the 
essays written by modern historians and economists, such as Lode Corneel 
Vereeck (1993), Peter Senn (1993), Hartwin Spenkuch et al. (2010a),1 and 
Jingyoung Yu (2011), a votum written by Minister of culture Adalbert Falk in 
1877, and the University Bylaws of Prussian higher education institutions written 
in 1882.2  
The ultimate goal of this research is to make a small contribution to history and 
economics by fostering a dialogue between the two social sciences and 
showing how economic research can be enriched through historical sources. It 
will bring to light traces of modern economic intuitions, intentions and thought 
processes in historical institutions, social collectives, and individuals. 
 
                                                 
1 This essay was part of a compilation edited by Wolfgang Neugebauer in 2010.  
2 Compiled by Paul Friedrich Dam. 
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THE PRUSSIAN EDUCATION SYSTEM AND ITS GOALS AT THE TURN OF 
THE CENTURY  
Prussia’s education system is one of the oldest in the world. Started by 
Frederick the great at the end of the 18th century, its scope, goals and 
purposes varied according with the time, place, context, and ruler. 
Nevertheless, education in Prussia always served the interests of the ruling 
class and the state, and was always seen as a tool to conduct government 
policy (Melton, 1988). 
In the 19th century, Prussia started to see a pressing need toward 
industrialization, the production of more and higher-quality consumer goods, 
and decreasing its dependence on land. In order to do this, even before Althoff 
and Falk’s time, some members of the Prussian government and its agencies 
started to tailor part of the education system, namely the Realschülen, toward 
economically driven interests and the qualification of the human capital for 
industrial labor (Büsch, 2012, p. 702). 
In addition to the Kaiser and his advisor’s realistic vision for Prussian future, the 
nobility was also changing its ways, albeit slowly and on an individual basis. 
Prussia’s noble class was starting to see the potential benefits and profits of an 
industrialized society, as well as an opportunity to maintain its power and 
economic status. This drove many Prussian nobles to support the interests of 
industrialists and even to become industrialists themselves, which allowed them 
to remain in power and to continue to exert political influence in the country until 
1914, amidst the rapidly declining relevance of agriculture in an increasingly 
industrialized Europe (Carsten, 1990).  
The mixture of a historical event that was swaying Europe, and the 
fragmentation and individualization of a political class that remained united until 
the run of the century, brewed a fertile ground for the government to gradually 
change the course of its policies toward a welfare system of sorts that actively 
financed but also controlled public education economically, politically and in 
curriculum matters. It was under these conditions that Adalbert Falk and 
Friedrich Althoff could lead the country’s education system with economic 
intuitions and intentions.  
THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF PUBLIC EXPENDITURE IN LATE 19TH 
AND EARLY 20TH CENTURY PRUSSIA  
Modern economists have tried to explain different historical contexts with the 
tools of their discipline since economics emerged. Educational policy in Prussia 
in the late 1800s and early 1900s is no exception.  
This section will strive to outline the main ideas of the two most relevant models 
that have dealt with this topic: Galor and Moav’s (2006) theoretical model, which 
outlines the conditions under which a society can transition toward a classless 
society through taxation, intergenerational transfers and investment of public 
funds in education, and Hollenbach’s (2019) statistical research, which found a 
causal relationship between levels of industrialization in Prussian cities and 
investment in education. 
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Galor and Moav’s Theoretical Model  
Galor and Moav argue that the demise of class society and the capitalist-worker 
dichotomy would only be possible through a cooperative effort between workers 
and industrialists, which would be reflected in a gradual increase in expenditure 
in public education (Galor & Moav, 2006, p. 85). The dynamic and intertemporal 
allocation model proposed by these academics argues that it will be more 
profitable for the industrialist class to start investing in public education 
unilaterally through taxes than saving all of their profits for future consumption. 
According to these authors, once enough physical capital is accumulated, 
investment in public education will improve the qualifications of the workers, 
making them more productive and increasing the profits of the next generation 
of industrialists. In addition, Galor and Moav also claim that this will increase the 
overall level of productivity, give more resources to the workers, and eventually 
encourage them to start contributing to the public education tax as well.  
This investment will gradually converge to a steady state equilibrium, where 
wealth and resources will be distributed optimally and equally across all 
members of society. The authors also call the steady state equilibrium the point 
of class society’s demise (Galor & Moav, 2006, p. 103).  
The Short and Unwinding Road to a Classless Society: A Graphic 
Approach  
The model (figure 1), just like the Gregorian calendar, is divided into two eras: 
before and after the birth of public education. The era before public education 
goes from    to  ̃. The authors assume that public education exists at every 
point after  ̃. The second era or regime, as the authors call it, is also divided 
into two stages. The first goes from  ̃ to  ̂, and models the time between the 
birth of public education and the time in which all people, regardless of social 
class, start to contribute to the tax system. The second stage lies between  ̂ 
and  ̅, and shows the transition from a society where everyone can contribute to 
the tax system to one where social classes no longer exist. 
The variable on the vertical axis is measured in overall future productivity per 
worker units     . It depends on the current productivity level per worker   .
3 
The current labor productivity per worker, in turn, is a function of both the 
current tax rate    and aggregate intergenerational transfers   (  
    
 ). Each 
lower case    represents the intergenerational transfers from the wealthy 






                                                 
3 This means that regime change will depend on current levels of productivity. Once a certain level of productivity is 
reached, society will transition to the next stage.  
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Figure 1. The three stages to reach a classless society 
 
Source: Simplified version of the figure found in Galor and Moav (2006, p. 105). 
The evolution of output per worker behaves differently in each regime and 
stage. In regime 1, the output is given by: 
      Max* , *, (   )   -  (     )    +
 -  + , -t+ 
The other variables represent technological development  , the minimum wage 
necessary to make intergenerational transfers possible  , the share of capital in 
total output owned by the capitalist class  , and the weight or importance that 
people give to intergenerational transfers  . 
In regime 2, stage I, the evolution of output per worker behaves according to the 
following expression: 
       ,(    )   
 - , (     
 )-    , - 
The only new variable (   ) represents the share of capital in total output not 
owned by the wealthy capitalist class. This stage is the first where investment in 
physical capital by the working class is possible. This characteristic is shown by 
the curve’s kink in the middle of the interval between  ̂ and   in figure 1.  
In stage II of regime 2, this evolution will be shown by the expression: 
       [(    ) ,    -]
 
, (   ,    -)-
    , - 
This stage of the model is the first one where the working class is willing and 
able to contribute to the public school system through taxes. In other words, this 
is the stage at where the previous investments, made by the rich capitalist 
class, are having an effect on the working class and are generating social 
mobility. It is also the first stage where the proletariat performs intergenerational 
transfers. Before this point, the model assumes they do not have enough 
capital; thus, no economic capability to do so.  
It is also important to note that, at this stage, the curve in the graph becomes 
smoother because of a greater propensity to save, coupled with a larger and 
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better income. This behavior means people will consume less in the present, 
lower the tax rate, and transfer the money directly to the next generation for 
future consumption. This feature of the model can be considered a prelude to 
the moment in which society reaches the steady-state equilibrium, a point at 
which productivity, technological advancement, tax rates, wages, the rate of 
direct intergenerational transfer, and capital distribution are equal and constant.  
Galor and Moav’s equations and graph show that society’s road to 
classlessness will depend on cooperation between the rich capitalist class, 
which owns the means of production, and the working class, which starts off 
with nothing but progressively gets richer due to the intergenerational transfers 
performed by the rich property owning capitalists in the first two stages of the 
model.  
The economic principle behind this dynamics lies in the fact that an increase in 
income will improve the overall quality of human capital, which will, in turn, 
improve labor productivity.4 In short, the model argues that cooperation 
between different social classes rather than violence and class struggle are the 
keys to achieving a classless society.5 Hence, the authors built a model where 
the productivity of the workforce increases with proper wages and time, better 
technology, and better education, and where education improves through the 
willingness of the ruling elites to pay their taxes.  
Hollenbach’s Empirical Model  
Taking Galor and Moav’s Model as his inspiration (Hollenbach, 2019, p. 3), 
Hollenbach employed the model that the original researchers applied in the 
United Kingdom and used it to analyze public expenditure in education and its 
relationship with industrialization in Prussian cities in the 19th century.6 The 
result was a causal relationship between per capita public expenditure in 
education and industrial employment: the variable he used as a proxy for 
industrial elite capital ownership (Hollenbach, 2019, p. 1). 
The author used three statistical models and the data from Prussian cities 
collected on the German census of 1907 to reach his goal. First, he performed 
six simple ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions to find a correlation 
between per capita expenditure in education and the level of industrialization in 
Prussian cities. Afterward, he performed a generalized spatial two-stage least 
square model (GS2SLS) to account for and mitigate the effects of spatial 
spillovers and spatial dependence between some variables in the models. 
                                                 
4 This economic principle, namely that economic growth and labor productivity are tied to the quality of human 
capital, was first described by Robert Solow and Trevor Swan in 1956. Nowadays, this model is considered part of 
the undergraduate (and sometimes the fundamental component of a graduate program) canon in macroeconomics in 
many universities around the world.  
5 The thesis of the model goes, explicitly, against Marx’s argument. The German economist and philosopher argued 
that the ruling capitalist elite had to be eliminated and that a dictatorship of the proletariat should be put in its place in 
order to transition to a classless society. In contrast, Galor and Moav argued that a classless society would only be 
achieved through cooperation.  
6 Hollenbach collected the data of 110 cities from different sources. Nevertheless, he used the 1907 census performed 
by Prussian authorities as his blueprint. For a more thorough review of the data and the sources it was taken from, see 
the electronic supplement to Hollenbach (2019), found for free at https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11558-
019-09347-z#Sec10 
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Finally, he used an instrumental variable model to reaffirm his findings and 
prove a causal relationship between his two variables. 
The Simple OLS Regression Model  
Hollenbach began his research by performing a set of simple OLS regression 
models. Instead of taking a particular parameter as his reference frame, he 
decided, first, to perform three separate tests with different amount of control 
variables: applying no control to his first test, a limited number of controls for his 
second test, and a full array of controls, which included province fixed effects, 
the difference between population parameters and the full hypothesis, in the 
third test. The general formula used for these regressions was: 
               industrial             , - 
where    is the measure of educational investment in a particular Prussian city, 
according to German the census of 1907;   is the common intersect;      is the 
matrix of control variables;    the corresponding vector of coefficients; industrial 
the variable that measures industrial employment in city  . Finally,   
corresponds to the estimated rate of change in education expenditure when a 
marginal change in industrial employment occurs and    is the error term.  
The main result drawn from these regressions was that expenditure in 
education was highly sensitive to industrial employment, since one standard 
deviation increase from the mean in the independent variable was related to a 
6% increase in per capita public expenditure in education.7 Furthermore, the 
author also claims that all his tests were statistically significant at a level of 5%.8 
Hollenbach also noted that his confidence interval did not include the number 0, 
which means that, no matter how slight, there would always be an impact of per 
capita investment in education over industrial employment (Hollenbach, 2019, 
p. 15).  
The author confirmed his findings by correlating industrial employment and 
education enrolment. The results obtained when changing the dependent 
variable —while leaving the proxy for industrialization and the three 
mechanisms of control intact— yielded similar results to those he obtained 
when regressing public education investment (Hollenbach, 2019, p. 15). 
The Spatial Autoregressive Model  
Despite its robustness, Hollenbach was not satisfied with the results obtained 
by the first set of linear regressions because they did not account for potential 
spatial spillovers and correlations between cities that were close to one another. 
The author argued that, although not every city and town was an industrial 
center, smaller cities near an industrial center could also see an increase in 
demand for public education. Also, local elites from nearby urban centers with 
less industrial capabilities could become free riders of industrial centers elites. 
These situations could have an impact on the original regressions and even 
                                                 
7 This means that for every new or additional industrial job in one of the 110 Prussian cities taken into account by this 
model, per capita educational expenditure from the government increased in 6% in this particular city.  
8 This means that the probability of committing a type-1 error or rejecting the null hypothesis when it is assumed to 
be true is 5%.  
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generate biased estimates (Hollenbach, 2019, p. 15). His suspicions were 
confirmed by a Moran’s I test, through which the academic was unable to reject 
the null hypothesis of no spatial correlation in the residuals (Hollenbach, 2019, 
p. 15). 
To account for this, the author decided to build a GS2SLS model that included 
the spatial lag for the dependent variable by adding the industrial employment in 
every other city    and the neighboring structure of    (embodied in     ) to the 
original model. When placed together, these variables created a weighted 
average of adjacent cities’ influence on the dependent variable (Hollenbach, 
2019, p. 16). The author’s proposed equation for this new model was:  
     ∑     
   
              industrial      , - 
All the variables assigned with a meaning in the original model do not change in 
this one. ∑           accounts for the weighted average of the spatial lag 
generated by every other city included in the model, while   accounts for the 
spatial correlation parameter. The new variable values were based on the 
inverse distance between cities, which later were row standardized (Hollenbach, 
2019, p. 16).9 
The researcher found that the final results obtained from the GS2SLS were 
similar to those of the original OLS regression and that —although there was a 
possible spatial dependence— the spatial correlation parameter decreased 
substantially when province fixed effects were taken into account (Hollenbach, 
2019, p. 16). In other words, the results indicate that the distance from the cities 
to industrial zones located in other urban centers had little to no impact on 
educational expenditure, and thus, that using industrial employment as the 
dependent variable and as a proxy to measure industrialization in the original 
model in each individual city made sense, since this variable would only 
measure how industrialized each individual city (or observation) was, not being 
affected by the employment supply of other neighboring cities.  
After obtaining these results, Hollenbach’s research faced only three threats: 
the lack of strength in his findings —which until now proved no causal link 
between the proxy for industrialization and education—, omitted variable bias —
which meant the results could be altered if some variables in the error term 
where made explicit in the regression models—, and reverse causality —which 
implied that an increase in public education expenditure caused a greater 
degree of industrialization and not the opposite (Hollenbach, 2019, p. 16). 
To counter these issues, the author decided to treat industrial employment as 
an endogenous variable and use a geographic exogenous instrument for the 
model: the location of carboniferous rock strata. He used this measurement as 
his instrumental variable because another paper had pointed out that 
carboniferous areas were highly correlated with later coal discoveries, and coal 
was one of the most critical natural resources required to power factories in the 
                                                 
9 For a comprehensive explanation of the logic behind the model used by Hollenbach, see Maximum likelihood and 
generalized spatial two stage least squares estimators for a spatial autoregressive model with spatial autoregressive 
disturbances, by Drukker et al. (2013).  
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industrial era (Hollenbach, 2019, p. 17).10 The result, as expected, was a robust 
negative correlation within the bivariate regression between logged distance to 
carboniferous strata and industrial employment, yielding a    equal to 0.42 
(Hollenbach, 2019, p. 17).11  
Although Hollenbach is aware that he cannot prove that the covariance between 
the instrument and the unobserved error is a necessary assumption for 
performing the instrumental variable regression, he appeals to the reader’s 
common sense. Then, he argues it is highly unlikely that carboniferous strata 
influence the political process or the decisions of Prussian politicians; not least 
because rock strata precede political deliberation by a few million years 
(Hollenbach, 2019, p. 17). 
The academic also counters the concerns on “the influence of spatial 
dependence because of the geographic nature of the instrument” (Hollenbach, 
2019, p. 18) by performing another spatial two-stage least square model that 
uses the same variables as the original GS2SLS. Once again, the results of the 
Spatial 2sls model with heteroscedastic standard errors yielded similar results 
to those found in the original OLS model and the GS2SLS model (Hollenbach, 
2019, p. 18-19).  
The spatial-2sls results, according to Hollenbach, suggest a causal effect of 
industrial employment on education expenditure in a similar way in which OLS 
suggested a correlation between these variables. The research's general 
conclusion is that the members of an elite group will only invest in education if 
their investment increases the elite’s return on capital (Hollenbach, 2019, p. 19).  
Now that economics has provided a solid theoretical frame and a wealth of 
empirical evidence that shows a causal link between government spending in 
education and industrialization, we can proceed to prove that these findings 
were not incidental. Besides, the existence of a convincing amount of evidence 
shows that the intentions of historical actors, entrepreneurs and the German 
government had a significant economic grounding. 
THE ROOTS OF ECONOMIC INTENTIONS IN GERMANY’S EDUCATION 
POLICY  
To trace the economic intentions of Prussian government policy education we 
only have to turn back the clock to the early 1870s. Although the policy enacted 
throughout this decade was not as significant as later decisions, it shows that a 
faction of government officials, industrialists and politicians were thinking about 
educational policy through the lens of economics. 
                                                 
10 To obtain more information about the relationship between coal and carboniferous strata, see Coal and the 
European industrial revolution. University of Oxford: Discussion Papers in Economic and Social History. by 
Fernihough & O’Rourke (2014). 
11 According to the author, the robust F statistic for the first stage of the test with a full set of controls was 16.41 and 
17.64 in the one with partial controls. Compared to the available evidence, according to the author, these numbers 
show that the instrument is considerably strong to predict industrial employment (Hollenbach, 2019, p. 17). Although 
the author does not mention it directly in the paper, his statement seems to imply that Hollenbach is referring to a 
high degree of dispersion between the distances of different cities and carboniferous areas from the mean distance 
and that this significant dispersion makes the instrumental variable effective.  
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The First Attempt at an Educational Reform Grounded on Economics: The 
Sorrows of Minister Falk  
The most prominent but forgotten attempt to reform education in Prussia in 
favor of the industrialist elite’s economic interests and concerns was led by the 
Education, Religion and Medical Affairs Minister of the time, Adalbert Falk. 
Falk is generally remembered by current historians as the minister of the culture 
wars and is portrayed as a politically motivated man. His educational reform of 
1872 is described as a political maneuver to eliminate the influence of the 
catholic church from public education, at best, and as a measure to place 
Prussia at the forefront of competition between German states at worst.12 Even 
so, his government votum,13 sent to the ministry of the state on June the 7th, 
1877, shows a different perspective. 
Even though the first section of the votum shows a politically committed and 
ideologically charged minister, in the second section Falk expresses concern 
over “the current measures for the maintenance of public schools,” which had 
“become completely unsustainable.” According to the minister, “new unbearable 
burdens are ladening the state treasuries, and the rural communities are being 
unable to provide (public education) as they are supposed to” (Neugebauer, 
2010b, p. 247).  
The minister’s supported his claims by referring to the multiple discussions that 
the Landtag and the Herrenhaus had over this topic and a legal quarrel between 
a Prussian conservative politician and the local Lutheran church in Pleß. The 
proposal of the minister was to “further increase the support of the Prussian 
central government (for public education); support increase which, although 
hotly debated in parliament and government, seemed to yield unjust results” 
(Neugebauer, 2010b, p. 247). 
Despite his arguments and pleas, Spenkuh’s and Paetau’s essay claims that 
minister Falk’s proposal would end up being abandoned after the finance 
ministry considered the proposal too expensive and unnecessary to implement. 
Falk’s project was too ambitious, for it proposed to reform all areas of 
education. It was expensive because it would have meant investing two-fifths of 
Falk’s ministry’s total budget in the reform. It was inconvenient since the Kaiser 
and Bismarck had shifted their policy towards the culture war in the late 1870s, 
and therefore secularizing education was no longer a priority for them 
(Neugebauer, 2010a, p. 62).14 
                                                 
12 Education in Germany in the 19th century was regulated autonomously by each German state. Falk, as a minister 
for the Prussian government, only had influence in Prussia. 
13 Government Vota —a Latinism that is generally translated as vows in English— was the name given to certain 
government documents in Prussia and Germany throughout the 19th century, which outlined and communicated the 
plans and commitments of a Minister and his institution to the rest of the government and the emperor.  
14 The culture war was a political struggle between the German government and the catholic and Lutheran churches. 
The struggle permeated the political, social and economic spheres. Falk was very close to the National Liberals, who 
were committed to secularize education on both ideological and economic grounds. His reform proved too 
progressive for the Kaiser at that time and was one of the main reasons for the emperor to dismiss him in 1979. 
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Regardless of his failure, Falk’s small but significant contribution to the 
education system embodied in the educational reform of 1872,15 in addition to 
what he expressed through his votum, shows that this individual, at one of the 
highest government levels, had the intention of enacting reforms on the 
schooling system based, at least partly, in economic intuitions and the 
economic interests of the industrialist elite, which in turn was advocating for a 
more public and state-controlled education; a proposal that would make this 
service more accessible, but subordinate to the interests of the state and the 
industrialists. This, in a nutshell, is commensurable and very similar to the 
proposal of Galor and Moav. 
The Intentionality of private in Public Interests: German entrepreneurs 
financing education for the public  
Although Falk’s attempts at a radical education reform failed, he was not the 
only individual striving to change Prussia’s education. The industrialist class 
was also actively trying to make the school system serve their interests by 
financing and promoting, privately, the creation of trade schools and technical 
institutions. It is important to note that, in contrast to Falk, who also had political 
motivations to advocate for it, the leaders of the German industry were solely 
concerned with increasing their profits. 
The intentions of private industrialists, and the zeal with which they defended 
their private interests by sponsoring education, are better illustrated by Dr. 
Jingyoung Yu. In her Ph.D. thesis, Dr. Yu brought evidence from statistics of 
that period which showed there were 213 trade schools with 21,000 students in 
Prussia alone. To reaffirm the independent and private character of this 
endeavor, Dr. Yu quotes the director of trade schools in Kiel, who claimed that, 
during the 1870s, Falk’s ministry had left the task of sponsoring, organizing and 
managing trade schools to industrialists with private interests and ordinary 
citizens (Yu, 2011, p. 36). 
Through Helmut Naunin’s work, Dr. Yu also argues that the bourgeoisie of that 
time got increasingly aware of its responsibility to the community. This fact 
increased the bourgeoisie’s prestige and consolidated position of power, which 
was ultimately grounded on economic stability and not political connectivity or 
proximity to the central government (Yu, 2011, p. 38).  
The main argument one can derive from the author’s analysis is that the 
intentions of the industrialists —a more productive labor force— was not only a 
pipe dream that sometimes was championed by the central government, but 
rather an active, constant and self-regulated effort of industrialists, who left the 
evidence of their intentions in their independent investment on the Prussian 
education system through trade schools.  
These intentions are aligned to the economic models exposed. Only the regions 
with a strong presence of industrial class would autonomously create these 
                                                 
15 The Kaiser enacted an education reform in 1872 that separated the mittelschule (or middle school) from the 
elementary school, and placed all elementary, middle and high schools under state control, taking this control away 
from the church. The legislation proposed in the votum would expand the state’s powers at the school level, regulate 
universities, and surrogate all education in Prussia to the interests of the state. 
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kinds of trade schools, which would be similar to Hollenbach’s proposal of 
localized government expenditure based on the degree of industrialization, and 
only the children of working-class members of society would attend these trade 
schools. Also, they were specifically designed for vocational training, and most 
members of the Bourgeois wanted more than mere vocational training for their 
offspring, which is similar to the proposal of Galor and Moav. 
THE DAWN OF THE ALTHOFF SYSTEM  
Due to the liberal climate of self-regulation and the increase of privately 
sponsored higher education institutions, minister Puttkamer, the conservative 
who followed Falk, was ousted from the Ministry of Culture, Education and 
Medical Affairs. Gustav Konrad Heinrich von Goßler was put in his place, and 
Friedrich Althoff —a simple government official until that time— started to 
implement the set of policies that would revolutionize the Prussian education 
system through economic thought. Although minister von Goßler’s 
administration was not particularly conservative, his tenure would have probably 
gone unnoticed in education had it not been for Friedrich Althoff.  
Althoff was not a career politician, nor an idealist and, most definitely, not a 
conventional bureaucrat. He earned prominence because of Goßler’s tenure 
and remained prominent after Goßler was dismissed, not only for actively 
defending the industrialists’ interests at the state level but also for managing 
universities as firms, knowledge as a national resource, and education as an 
instrument of economic policy. This man started to gain prominence in 1882, 
when he received a call from the ministry to become a referendar,16 whose task 
was to appoint academic personnel. Although his official post had a pretty 
limited scope, those same years he was already performing significant 
contributions in matters of scientific and educational policy (Vereeck, 1993, p. 
30).  
The reason for Althoff to be able to accumulate so much power and exert so 
much influence through so many functions was partly due to the role of 
Prussian bureaucracy and partly due to his personal style. On the one hand, 
Prussia had a bureaucracy that was tasked, first and foremost with the welfare, 
stability and progress of the country and its citizens, in stark contrast to other 
monarchies, where bureaucracy was used to project the power of the king. On 
the other hand, Althoff’s personality was suited to the accumulation of work and 
power. The man was prone to micromanagement and thrived under stress 
(Peirce & Krüger 1993, p. 62-64). 
The cornerstone of Althoff’s system was to see research and education as a 
public good with externalities. He was the first one to consider knowledge as 
nonexcludable and nonrival, and to consider that its production generated 
effects on third parties which had positive and negative consequences to firms, 
industries and individuals (Vereeck, 1993, p. 17). This vision is also supported 
by Wolfgang Neugebauer, who, in his chapter published on a collection of 
essays on Prussian history, argues that the Althoff system was a great 
entrepreneurial endeavor controlled and managed by the state, which had a 
                                                 
16 Term used in Germany to refer to civil servants in training, who would later get senior positions in a public 
institution. 
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particular vision of the future, namely the economic welfare of Germany, and a 
network of hand-picked highly qualified employees, whose function was not only 
to improve the human capital available to work in firms and perform academic 
researches but also to use this specialized human capital to research specific 
fields that where of interest to the state and to the betterment of its economy 
(Büsch, 2012, p. 766).  
Althoff was so committed to the quality of his product —namely academic 
research, scientific progress and mass production of highly qualified human 
capital— that he decided to make tenured professors some of the best paid 
employees in Germany, giving them economic incentives, handpicking them 
personally, as if he was the CEO of a modern corporation, and fostering and 
environment of brutal competition between applicants and amongst the faculty 
to ensure only the best of the best would continue to hold their jobs for 
extended periods of time (Senn, 1993). 
When called by the ministry to become an advisor, this man designed a system 
based on six principles connected through his cornerstone idea of education as 
a public good and universities as a fiercely competitive firm, which guided the 
Prussian education system until 1910. These principles were the 
bureaucratization and professionalization of the university administration, tighter 
government control on the system of employment for professors, the 
specialization of universities in particular areas of knowledge, the procurement 
of private funds for research, the creation of fruitful academic relationships with 
universities abroad, and the creation of a network of foreign contacts within 
universities that would help the government to attain these goals (Neugebauer, 
2010a, p. 172).  
Out of these principles, four had a direct economic intuition lying behind them. 
The first aimed to increase the university's labor productivity, making it a more 
efficient producer of professionals who would enter the labor market and 
knowledge or research which would be useful for the state. The second 
principle would contribute to the same goal: university professorship would 
become like any other job, a careful selection process from which the most 
capable and productive worker can emerge. The third one, which is probably 
the most congruent with Hollenbach’s research, had to do with regional 
specialization. This specialization was made to meet the needs and interests of 
those who funded the research, mostly were private industrialists.  
Finally, the fourth principle shows economic intentionality because it aligned the 
interest of public universities with the interests of those who were willing and 
able to fund a research and were interested in doing so. The transactional 
character of this measure and the intention behind the initiative was so clear, 
that Althoff established the Kaiser Wilhelm Institut and funded scholarships 
through this institution; even Siemens took advantage of Althoff’s scholarship 
programme (Neugebauer, 2010a, p. 198). Thus, the university became a direct 
service provider for industrialists, who would help finance and sponsor this body 
in exchange for its targeted research. 
The principles for which Althoff advocated intuitively implemented the most 
important ideas from the model of Galor and Moav into government policy, by 
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doing so, these very same principles paved the way to validate Hollenbach’s 
empirical research.  
It is important to highlight that some parts of the policy were designed for the 
industrialist class to invest directly, independently and privately instead of 
relying on taxes, a key feature of Galor and Moa’s model. Even so, the Althoff 
system was set up to produce what Galor and Moav’s model theory wanted to 
produce, that is, high-quality specialized research (technology) and a 
professionally and technically capable human capital. In other words, research 
and people who served the interests of the industrialist elites and the state. This 
government policy was so successful that its consequences soon became an 
integral part of the bylaws of several Prussian and German universities in 
general. 
INTENTIONS ENGRAVED IN STONE: THE UNIVERSITY BYLAWS AFTER 
ALTHOFF  
The legacy of Friedrich Althoff did not limit itself to increasing the prestige of 
Prussian universities abroad. The policies eventually reached the documents of 
government and the statutes of the universities he set himself to reform in 1882. 
The evidence of his work was collected by Paul Friedrich Damm, who compiled 
the bylaws of several universities around the German empire. According to the 
editor’s sources, the University of Berlin stated mission was to “provide the best 
education for the industrial life of the state and the municipality” (Damm, 2019, 
p. 55). 
The bylaws also state that the institution was “entirely subordinated to the 
ministry for cultural, educational and medical affairs” (Damm, 2019, p. 55). The 
ministry had the power to determine and increase or decrease “the departments 
of the university and their respective disciplines” (p. 55). He also had to appoint 
a government official who would supervise “all economic questions of the 
university, and support the headmaster for taking all the material related 
decisions of the university” (Damm, 2019, p. 66). These two provisions gave all 
effective control of the academic direction and the university’s economic 
expenditures to the government. This document was approved in 1882, and it 
remained unchanged until the end of the First World War. It was Althoff’s first 
act as a prominent government official, and it would outlast his reign in power. 
Beyond the impact of Althoff and his legacy, these documents show that, by the 
early 1880s and throughout the following three decades, the government would 
intentionally adopt a capitalist interest-driven policy; one in which industry and 
productivity, sponsored by government and private funds, were at the forefront 
of the decisions of the government. The Althoff system also shows that at the 
beginning of the decade it was not only industrialists and individuals but also the 
government who was also intending to drive its educational policy along 
economic lines.  
In addition, the policies outlined by the bylaws are also entirely consistent with 
the model of Galor and Moav since they subordinate the administration of 
education to the state and provide public funding while at the same time make 
education a tool for the industry. Furthermore, these bylaws are also consistent 
with Hollenbach’s findings: the university could adapt its curriculum according to 
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the industrial needs of a city. As its finance depended entirely on a government 
official, this official could deem the university useful or useless in the function of 
the industry it served. 
CONCLUSIONS  
Throughout this paper, individuals’ historical intentions, a social class and a 
government were analyzed in order to trace clusters of economic thought based 
on two models. After a thorough analysis, the main conclusion overwhelmingly 
shows that the economic intuitions of the models by Hollenbach, Galor and 
Moav were present in Prussian policymakers, industrialists and government, 
remaining in force since the 1880s until the start of the great war.  
A secondary conclusion is that Galor and Moav’s theoretical model and 
Hollenbach’s empirical model are consistent with the economic reality of 
Prussia and their results are not the product of chance nor coincidence. Those 
results reflect concrete economic intentions and actions of historical actors at a 
particular time.  
These two conclusions fulfil the paper’s aims, namely, to foster a dialogue 
between history and economics and to enrich economic theory through history 
by showing how primary and secondary sources can give names, lives and 
intentions to stakeholders and prominent figures that economics treats as 
simple variables.  
Further studies should find similar correlations in areas such as healthcare 
expenditure or expenditure in other industrial goods. On the historical side, a 
deeper investigation of the available primary sources, on the ministry of finance 
documents, and this ministry’s attitude throughout Althoff’s administration would 
also enrich the field. Further questions can also be asked about the attitude, 
intentions, and decisions of other historical actors, such as conservative rural 
elites, whose perspective was left out of this analysis. 
The impact of particular historical events, paramount to the history of Prussia 
and Germany, should also be analyzed more deeply in future research. This is 
a fertile and unexplored field with many areas that can be discussed in other 
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